President Vladimir Putin openly admits that economic sanctions “seriously harm Russia”. Imposed largely in response to the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions have since become a mainstay of Russian foreign policy, perhaps even motivating the Kremlin’s interference in it. 2016 US presidential election on behalf of actively pro-Russian candidate Donald Trump. Putin has good reason to want them lifted: the sanctions, according to some reports, have “suppressed the momentum of the Russian economy.”
But did they also suck the very life out of Russia? There is reason to believe that Western sanctions may have pushed Russia off a demographic cliff.
Something unusual is happening in Russia these days: Russians are having far fewer children in 2017 than last year. Consider the following graph, based on demographic data from Goskomstat, the statistical service of the Federal State of Russia. It shows the number of children born each month as a percentage of the number of children born during the same month of the previous year. Despite variations from month to month, a clear downward trend has emerged over the past year. In 11 of the past 12 months, Russia has seen a significant drop in the number of children born compared to the previous year. For most of 2017, there were between 10% and 15% fewer births. What is happening here?
President Vladimir Putin openly admits that economic sanctions “seriously harm Russia”. Imposed largely in response to the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions have since become a mainstay of Russian foreign policy, perhaps even motivating the Kremlin’s interference in it. 2016 US presidential election on behalf of actively pro-Russian candidate Donald Trump. Putin has good reason to want them lifted: the sanctions, according to some reports, have “suppressed the momentum of the Russian economy.”
But did they also suck the very life out of Russia? There is reason to believe that Western sanctions may have pushed Russia off a demographic cliff.
Something unusual is happening in Russia these days: Russians are having far fewer children in 2017 than last year. Consider the following graph, based on demographic data from Goskomstat, the statistical service of the Federal State of Russia. It shows the number of children born each month as a percentage of the number of children born during the same month of the previous year. Despite variations from month to month, a clear downward trend has emerged over the past year. In 11 of the past 12 months, Russia has seen a significant drop in the number of children born compared to the previous year. For most of 2017, there were between 10% and 15% fewer births. What is happening here?
In 2016, Russia registered 1,893,237 births and 1,887,907 deaths, for a natural population increase of only 5,330 people, not counting immigration. In contrast, from January to August 2017, Russia registered 1,131,543 births for 1,236,108 deaths, for a net loss of 104,565 people. Extrapolating forward for the full year, Russia is on track to register just 1,697,000 births and around 1,854,000 deaths, or 157,000 Russians less in 2017.
Certainly, with a total population of around 146 million people, 157,000 missing are barely noticeable, and to suggest that Russia is in some sort of demographic death spiral would be misleading. Although still far behind their European neighbors, Russians today are healthier and live longer than at any time in their history, and these positive trends show no signs of changing. It’s good news.
But especially in light of these gradual improvements, we still have to explain why Russians suddenly have fewer children. And the most plausible hypothesis calls into question Western economic sanctions. The cause is simple: Economic sanctions have hampered the Russian economy, resulting in poverty and economic uncertainty leading to fewer Russians having children.
There is ample evidence to back it up: the double shock of US and European sanctions in 2014 and the drop in the world price of oil – Russia’s main export product – produced in Russia in 2015 an economic contraction of – 3.7% of GDP, increased capital flight and budget deficits and a plunging ruble that has depreciated by more than 50% against the dollar. Even more worrying, rising unemployment and a sudden rise in the number of Russians living in poverty – from 15.5 million in 2013 to 19.8 million in 2016. Even Putin’s former finance minister Alexei Kudrin predicts persistent economic malaise under international sanctions. Logically, in such an economic gloom, Russian families would be reluctant to have additional children.
The other explanation is that these are just long term demographic trends. Putin’s Russia has been on the brink of a demographic abyss for some time, because of the current regime. When communism collapsed 25 years ago, it not only took the Soviet Union with it, but also unleashed an unprecedented demographic catastrophe. During the economic depression of the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin, Russian mortality skyrocketed. Men’s life expectancy has hit a low of around 59 years. At the same time, fertility collapses. Few parents chose to have children they could not provide for themselves, resulting in a “baby fall” and a sharp population decline during much of the 1990s. Few girls born in the 1990s mean few potential mothers today, producing a natural “echo” that demographers have anticipated for years. What we are seeing, then, is the start of an inevitable long-term decline in Russia’s population which, by 2050, will make Russia the 15th most populous country, behind the Philippines and Tanzania.
It’s hard to argue against this hackneyed “demographics is fate” trope: Russia’s impending demographic decline is very real. But there is reason to believe that Western sanctions have accelerated Russia to the brink of the precipice.
First: Russian and international demographers and statisticians are indeed very good at what they do. Long-term population forecasts hit 94 percent of the time, and when they are wrong it is often due to unforeseen political factors, such as catastrophic war or economic depression. As with your local weather forecast, the more you predict into the future, the more likely your forecast is to be wrong. This is what makes the following projections from the most recent Goskomstat Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 2015 (published in 2016) so interesting. Based on the total fertility rates and the size of the cohort of childbearing age, they calculate “high”, “medium” and “low” standard forecasts of the development of the population of Russia. Assuming “business as usual,” in 2016, these demographic experts estimated a population increase of between 108,300 and 492,000 for 2017, with an average estimate of an additional 311,800 Russians. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Russia is in fact forecasting a net population loss of around 157,000 in 2017. Even the most short-term standard projections have gone wrong – the actual number of around a quarter of a million. below even the most pessimistic estimate – suggesting that external factors, such as a prolonged economic recession, are dragging Russia’s population down.
Second, in recent years Russia has benefited from immigration, especially from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. However, the number of migrants in the first half of 2017 was the lowest since 2010 and will not be enough to offset the natural decline in Russia’s population, further suggesting that the sanctions-laden Russian economy has lost its appeal. Migration is driven by politics and economics, not demographics.
“Demography is a vital issue that will influence the development of our country for decades to come,” President Putin recently declared. And he’s right. The difference between an optimistic scenario and a pessimistic scenario today could mean a projected difference of some 13.5 million Russians by 2035: this is only a few election cycles away. Imagine the potential of 13.5 million more people: more taxpayers, businessmen, innovators, artists and conscripts. On the other hand, sustaining economic growth is becoming increasingly difficult for those who remain in a steadily shrinking population. What we are seeing in 2017 is the start of Russia’s long-term demographic decline. How far and how quickly Russia falls will make all the difference, and President Putin certainly knows that.
In 2016, a US State Department official said, “The sanctions are designed not to push Russia over the economic cliff,” explaining that short-term pressures “would be bad for the Russian people.” It is therefore somewhat ironic that the long-term consequence of the sanctions is rather to push Russia over a demographic cliff.